
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Mike Griffin, second from left, was among the four Defense Department representatives that testified at the June 21 hearing. (Image credit – C-SPAN)
Last month, the House Armed Services Committee held a hearing
Witnesses from the government’s defense and intelligence communities outlined a variety of legal and illegal means that the Chinese government uses to acquire U.S. technology and expertise. Representing the latest in a series of hearings at which Trump administration officials and some congressional leaders have aired concerns about China’s expansive R&D strategy, it offered perhaps the bluntest articulation to date of the potential implications for U.S.-China relations.
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Mike Griffin framed the situation in particularly stark terms, drawing parallels with the Cold War to suggest the U.S. should consider fundamentally altering its posture toward China’s academic and business communities.
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Mike Griffin, second from left, was among the four Defense Department representatives that testified at the June 21 hearing. (Image credit – C-SPAN)
Committee Chair Mac Thornberry (R-TX) opened the hearing by citing Defense Secretary Jim Mattis’ assessment
Thornberry quoted several findings of a recent Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx) report
DIUx found that ‘the U.S. does not have a comprehensive policy or the tools to address this massive technology transfer to China [and] does not have a holistic view of how fast this technology transfer is occurring, the level of Chinese investment in U.S. technology, or what technologies we should be protecting.’
“That left us in a very, very strong position for several decades, but that was highly unusual. So even if China wasn’t doing all this nefarious stuff,” Smith said, “we’re going to have to compete.” He argued that the U.S. must leverage its alliances with other nations and embrace industrial policy to keep ahead.
Thornberry said the hearing would help inform the committee’s deliberations on this year’s pending
Meanwhile, the House bill would allow DOD to deny funding
The witnesses submitted a joint statement
Describing the overarching aim of their testimony, Griffin said, “We appear before you to discuss the very real Chinese adversarial behavior to which you have referred. And this is not about the threat of such behavior; this is real behavior.”
“We are here, in part, to recognize that this is a whole-of-government, indeed, a whole-of-society problem,” he added.
While Griffin said he strongly believes in the value of international alliances and exchanges, he argued China must be viewed as an adversary because of the “breadth and depth of Chinese malfeasance” toward the U.S., citing intellectual property theft as an example. He contrasted the past U.S. stance toward the Soviet Union with its present posture toward China, remarking, “During the Cold War, there was a whole-of-nation policy such that the idea of doing a commercial deal with the Soviet Union were words that didn’t fit in one sentence. We don’t have such policies today.”
Among other actions, he suggested the U.S. ought to consider restricting the number of Chinese STEM graduate students admitted into the country, saying:
We as a nation have choices. Do we wish to admit, as we have today, 30,000 Chinese Ph.D. students in STEM areas? Do we wish to do that? Do we think the benefits outweigh the gains [sic]? There is not a national decision in that regard as there was when we were competing against the Soviet Union. We didn’t do those things.
It’s not for me to say whether we should or should not. I’m trying to put on the table that these apparently isolated decisions in fact when taken together comprise a whole-of-government strategy that we do not have.
The administration has already implemented new visa screening measures
In testimony submitted
The U.S. National Intelligence Council created the above chart to summarize its view of the key components of China’s technology development strategy. A similar chart is cited in a recent congressional letter asking Education Secretary Betsy Devos to scrutinize partnerships that the Chinese technology company Huawei has formed with U.S. universities. (Image credit – U.S. National Intelligence Council)
In calling for a comprehensive policy to counter technology transfer to China, the witnesses pointed not only to the scale of Chinese activities but also their variety. Anthony Schinella, a witness representing the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, said the Chinese government is pursuing a comprehensive strategy encompassing increased domestic investments in science and technology infrastructure, acquisition of technology companies, joint business ventures, cyber espionage, and research collaborations with universities and national laboratories, among other methods.
Elaborating on U.S. intelligence agencies’ concerns about academic partnerships, Schinella said, “Foreign governments often use every means at their disposal to secure an advantage in technological areas, and their exploitation of academics and researchers at U.S. colleges, national laboratories, and other institutions is one of those means.” He added that China in particular “actively seeks partnerships with government laboratories to learn about and acquire specific technology and the soft skills necessary to run such facilities. China also uses collaborations and relationships with universities to acquire specific research and access to high-end research equipment.”
Schinella also said China operates several talent recruitment programs that are “specifically focused on recruiting global experts who can facilitate the transfer of foreign technology, intellectual property, and know-how to advance China’s science, technology, and military modernization goals.”
Citing concerns about such efforts, Rep. Vicky Hartzler (R-MO) asked Schinella whether the U.S. should prevent Chinese students from participating in Ph.D. programs. Schinella replied it is not within his purview to weigh in on the subject.
Rep. Jim Banks (R-IN) also aired concerns about how companies linked to the Chinese government have established research partnerships with U.S. universities. Banks noted that he and Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL) spearheaded a June 19 letter
Both Griffin and Eric Chewning, deputy assistant under secretary of defense for manufacturing and industrial base policy, affirmed that DOD is also concerned about such collaborations. Chewning said DOD is “reviewing the contract language associated with those research projects” and is searching for a broader solution.
“We have an open innovation model, and we have an adversary that is within that model and operates a closed model on their own side. We need to experiment to find what the structural fix is for that without breaking what makes our system work the best in the world,” he said.